Introduction
In recent decades, economists have struggled with the tension between static and dynamic analyses and the implications for the understanding of markets, organizations, and industry transformation. Sidney Winter helped initiate concerns amongst economists and other social scientists about the static nature of neoclassical production theory and its caricature of the business enterprise. Winter's article "Towards a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm" (1968, 2006) can be understood as an attempt to frame the issue of what's wrong with the received economic theory of the firm. In the process, he led the way toward new conceptualizations of the business enterprise. The ideas presented remain significant in current debates on evolutionary economics and business strategy. They were extended, beginning in the late 1960s, in Winter's collaboration with Richard Nelson resulting in the Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, which has had a significant impact on the theory of the firm and on the theory of business strategy. This article maps part of the intellectual history (and 1 We are grateful to Giovanni Dosi, Andrew Marshall, Sidney Winter, Jim March, and Richard Nelson for many stimulating conversations about the topics of this paper over the years and to Patricia Lonergan for excellent assistance. The support from the Sloan Foundation, the Kaufmann Foundation and the RAND Corporation for access to their archives is gratefully acknowledged.
Several contributors (Teece et al., 2002; Dosi, 2004; Jacobides, 2006; Nelson, 2006) have noted the influence of behavioral thinking (in particular the ideas from Simon, March, and Cyert) on the evolutionary economics program. The behavioral research program is quite complementary to evolutionary economic theory (Nelson, 2006) . It investigates how the characteristics of business firms as organizations affect important business decisions. Its pioneers focused on classical problems in economics (such as pricing, resource allocation, and capital investment) as a lens to examine the processes for making decisions in organizations. In particular, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert and March, 1963) extended the earlier ideas (of March and Simon, 1958) by elaborating concepts of organizational slack, adaptive aspirations, organizational learning, and the role of rules and routines. Cyert and March furthermore addressed a major dilemma of organization theory: the choice between a realistic, but unmanageable theoretical model of organization, and a simple, manageable one. Using computer simulations, a relatively realistic description of actual processes was sought.
Recent work from evolutionary economists has developed and elaborated these ideas, integrating concepts such as bounded rationality and satisficing with concepts such as routines, technological evolution, and innovation (Dosi, 2004) . These concepts are often applied to the study of specific industries, such as the evolution of the US computer industry. This work follows a direct path from the behavioral program. As was concluded in a recent survey of evolutionary thinking in economics, "The view of firm behavior built into evolutionary economic theory fits well with the view of firms contained in modern organization theory, especially the part that shares our own debt to the 'Carnegie School' [March, Simon, and Cyert] " (Nelson and Winter, 2002: 42) . In addition to these thematic similarities, there are other benefits from integrating evolutionary economics and behavioral contributions: both research programs contribute significantly to a better understanding of strategic issues (as seen from recent developments in the field of strategic management).
Both the behavioral and evolutionary research programs were, at least in part, stimulated by the problem-driven research that took part at RAND in the 1950s and 1960s, where the article of Winter (1968 Winter ( , 2006 was written. Despite occasional differences, 2 we find that both behavioral and evolutionary ideas can help inform current issues in strategy as they relate to organizations. In keeping with this spirit, Dosi 2 For example, unlike the behavioralist, the evolutionary program of Nelson and Winter aimed at finding a theory of industry behavior which could accommodate (but would not be limited to) a behavioral theory of firm. As they wrote, "We diverge from the behavioral theorists in our interest in building an explicit theory of industry behavior, as contrasted with individual firm behavior. This means on the one hand that our characterizations of individual firms are much simpler and more stylized than those employed by the behavioral theorists and on the other hand that our models contain a considerable amount of apparatus linking together the behavior of collections of firms" (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 36 
Early contributions from RAND
RAND has made important contributions to the development of intellectual frameworks that shape foreign policy, military strategy, and global peace. RAND was also important in the development of a number of sciences in the post-World War II period. Many early evolutionary ideas were developed at the RAND Corporation. RAND was created in 1946 as an Air Force think tank. It was located close to the beach at Santa Monica, far from the corridors of power in Washington DC. It was conceived initially to conduct long-term scientific and technical planning for the Air Force as a separate division of Douglas Aircraft Company. However, soon after its reorganization in 1948 as an independent research corporation, RAND's work began to assume a much larger role than mere scientific planning for the Air Force. Indeed, driven by Cold War concerns, RAND became the foremost institution in the US, if not the world, devoted to research on decision-making and behavior under conditions of uncertainty. This research ranged from studies of individual decision-making to the effects of nuclear war on US organizations. From an early stage, this was deemed to involve economic research (Augier and March, 2006) . RAND researchers pioneered research across a broad range of social sciences, in many cases establishing the intellectual base that continues to underpin the state of knowledge in these fields today (Hounshell in Hughes and Hughes, 2000; Mirowski, 2001) . For example, RAND researchers made fundamental contributions to game theory, linear and dynamic programming, war gaming, computer simulation, artificial intelligence, computational architectures, operations research, systems analysis, the economics of R&D, the economics of information, cost analysis, organizational behavior, experimental protocols, and behavioral and evolutionary economics (Flood, 1951; Alchian, 1953) . It is now widely recognized that RAND played a crucial role in the development of the field of operations research (Mirowski, 2001) , non-linear programming, the economics of technical change (Hounshell in Hughes and Hughes, 2000) , the emergence of computers and artificial intelligence (Mirowski, 2001) , and systems analysis.
Soon after its creation, RAND became the leading center of game theoretical research, with both von Neumann and Morgenstern as RAND consultants. To spur the development of game theory at this early stage, the corporation sponsored a conference on the applications of game theory to military tactics in Chicago on March 14-15, 1949 (Helmer, 1949 . It was attended by almost everybody who was anybody in early game theory, including Arrow, Belzer, Blackwell, Flood, Girshick, Savage, and Shapley, many of whom became staff or consultants to RAND soon after the Understanding complex organization 399 conference. By the end of 1949, RAND had produced path-breaking work in game theoretical formulations of duels, defensive tactics, and multimove games, among other things. In all, more than 90 individuals produced research memoranda on game theory at RAND from 1946 to 1962, including Kenneth Arrow and John Nash. And books, formal reports, and other papers were produced covering all aspects of this emerging field.
Yet, despite the remarkable productivity achieved by RAND's researchers, many at RAND considered game theory to be a failure. By the mid-1950s, it seemed increasingly clear that game theory was useful in analyzing only the most simple forms of conflict and would not soon provide a reliable tool for studying complex engagement, such as the US-USSR relations. Some RAND researchers were increasingly convinced that agents were not as rational as game theory wanted them to be. Perhaps, it was merely the case that agents made mistakes. Perhaps, alternatively, they were boundedly rational. Merrill Flood conducted a set of experiments supporting the notion that agents did not behave rationally (which, in turn, led to the famous Prisoners Dilemma, cf. Flood, 1951 Flood, , 1952 Poundstone, 1992) . As a result, the Air Force gradually realized the need for a broader, social-science-based approach to help understand the Cold War issues and the complex behavior of individuals and large organizations, such as the Soviet Union.
This perceived weakness in the utility of game theory led the RAND strategist, Andrew Marshall, to start building a community at RAND around behavioral perspectives on organizational decision-making. He invited Herbert Simon, James March, and Sidney Winter (among others) to participate.
3 This initiative stimulated the thinking about bounded rationality, evolution, the effects of technological change, and other factors which are important in modern economics.
The poor results of game theoretic experiments cast doubt on rational choice theory and led others such as Herbert Simon, Allen Newell, and James G. March to develop ideas on bounded rationality and behavioral economics. Simon held an appointment at Carnegie Mellon University, and his presence at RAND led to a bond between RAND and Carnegie, in particular around the "Complex Information Processing" project, carried out jointly by Carnegie and RAND. Fundamentally, this 3 As Marshall recalls, "It was clear to me that what we were trying to forecast in the Soviet military was the behavior of these large organizations. At that time, there was a tendency to think of such an organization as almost a single rational planner. This rational, maximizing planner is planning the whole Soviet force, and the organization is logical and rational and all that nonsense. ... And it clearly wasn't true. It was clear to me that there were many factors influencing the kind of decisions that were made in these organizations. To me, the alternative to viewing organizations as rational planners was to look at organizational behavior as the output of complicated organizations with habits and histories and practices and so on" (Interview with Andrew Marshall, Unpublished interview by Mie Augier). research carried over Simon's interest with organizational decision-making and combined it with research in artificial intelligence. 4 Other issues explored at RAND included the economics of technological change. The question was whether there was some way in which the private sector could be relied upon to come up with a working technology in a reasonable time frame for exotic new weapons like an ICBM. Many economists were recruited to work on the as yet non-existent field of technological change-including Nelson and Winter. It was Armen Alchian who hired Sidney Winter and Richard Nelson to do research on technological change and weapons research. This initiated a fruitful collaboration that led to important work (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Personal interaction with Armen Alchian at RAND also led Sidney Winter to rethink selection mechanisms and evolution as a way to explain change (Interview with Winter). One can observe that many aspects of Nelson and Winter's subsequent work bear much more of a debt to RAND than to any inspiration from biology. The issues they explored included, the fascination with firms as the locus of technical change, the recurring argument over whether anything is being maximized, the conceptualization of "routines," and tacit knowledge.
RAND strategist Marshall went on in the 1970s to set up a think tank in the White House (later the Pentagon) and produced path-breaking ideas for the defense community. Thus, there was an early awareness that behavioral and evolutionary ideas could provide contributions to strategic thinking in the military context; later, Winter and Teece showed the way for the judicious application of behavioral and economic ideas to the field of strategic management and business strategy. These examples indicate some of the similarities in the early thinking on strategic management (Teece and Winter) and military strategy (Marshall).
Schumpeterian and behavioral contributions to strategic management
Building on Winter's (1968 Winter's ( , 2006 provocative remarks, Teece and Winter contended that the tensions between neoclassical theory of the firm and the theory and practice of management stemmed from the cavalier treatment in economics of know-how, the static focus of neoclassical theory, and the strong behavioral assumptions around (hyper)rationality embedded in neoclassical theory (Teece, 1984; Teece and Winter, 1984; Simon, 1993; Winter, 2003 ). Winter's recent work also deals with such issues, 4 "Report on Activities," RAND, reports: "Beginning in 1955, successful research into these problems [on organizational decision making], under the project name of Complex Information Processing, was initiated in both organizations. The cooperation, entirely informal, between GSIA and RAND has continued down to the present time, and the scale of the research efforts in both organizations is now substantial-involving about ten professionals at RAND, and half dozen faculty members and an equal number of graduate students at Carnegie."
Understanding complex organization 401 trying to build into strategy ideas of bounded rationality, learning and satisficing (e.g. Winter, 2000 Winter, , 2003 . The theme of rationality is one of several that sets apart management as a field from (mainstream) economics. The field of management does not accept the strong rationality hypothesis. One must recognize, however, that the notion of rational action is deeply engrained in most economists. As Kenneth Arrow explained, "[a]n economist by training things of himself as the guardian of rationality, an ascriber of rationality to others, and the prescriber of rationality to the social world" (Arrow, 1974: 16) . Rationality is reason. It is self-interest. It is strategic action and transitive preferences. And yet, rationality is also a sort of simple and comfortable reason that seems so natural that it is almost ordinary in its orderliness. Rationality has spread from the natural to the social sciences and has in recent decades deeply penetrated economics, sociology, and psychology. For economists in particular, rationality has been the short cut used to model human action.
The absence of strong rationality in the real world creates difficulties. The hyperrationality assumptions of most economic theorists deny the existence of the irrational and the random. Biases, mistakes, and regrets are not supposed to occur. Unfortunately, observations tell us that human actors frequently are not rational (see, for instance, the extensive experimental work from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky). Although the supreme language of rationality, mathematics, has grown in scope and application since its inception (and grown in usage among economists), the mere fact that one of the central defenders of rationality, Kenneth Arrow, makes repeated and subtle references to many of the violations of rationality assumptions illustrates the central place that the less than rational and perhaps even the random (or, to use March's (1991 March's ( , 2006 words, the "foolish") is beginning to occupy modern thought.
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Yet neoclassical economics still relies on assumptions of perfect rationality. The neoclassical paradigm does not leave room for organizations, firms, strategies, or anything that deviates from what can be modeled as "rational." To the extent that firms exist in neoclassical microeconomics, it is in the form of production functions or production sets.
Herb Simon long argued that understanding of organizational phenomena required a perspective much different. Decision-making in the real world is aimed at finding a satisfactory solution (satisficing), rather than the best possible alternative 5 We are referring here to Kenneth Arrow, defender of general equilibrium and individual rationality, who repeatedly has mentioned uncertainty, irrationality, learning, mistakes, and other signs of nonrationality. In his own words, he also changed over time toward the irrational: "It is my view that most individuals underestimate the uncertainty of the world. ... My general sense of beauty has shifted with time ... I am more interested in the struggle for knowledge than in elegant systematization. Simple symmetries are not as satisfying as they were, and I look much more for a sense of openness, of incompleteness and stretching out toward an unknown, than for closed form" (Arrow, 1992: 46 and 50). (optimization). Following this view, management is the art if dealing effectively with the challenges of bounded rationality in a changing and uncertain environment.
6 Strategic management builds on and contributes to such a view of reasoned, but not maximizing, behavior. Teece and Winter (1984) also identified other shortcomings in economics relevant to both the theory and the practice of management. Ironically, economists have been aware of the limitations inherent in their discipline, as indicated below; but they are often unwilling or unable to actively reform their analysis or change the theory. Elegance has won out over relevance, to the great detriment of management theory and the theory of the firm. The critique delivered twenty plus years ago is still relevant today.
Underemphasis on dynamics
Most management issues are dynamic problems. Although comparative statics is one way to get at dynamic issues, it suffers from inattention to the path to equilibrium, a matter which is usually exceedingly important (Machlup, 1967) . This is a more general problem of the inability to explain change, which confronts neoclassical economics. As the economist Frank Hahn metaphorically illustrated, "Suppose, for instance, it is possible for an egg to stay standing on its tip until it is disturbed. We should not attach great practical significance to this equilibrium of the egg until we are told some causal story of how it comes to be in that state. In exactly the same way, the proposition that, in certain circumstances, there is a set of prices which ensures equality between demand and supply in all markets tells of nothing of whether these prices will indeed be established by a market economy" (Hahn, 1982: 13) .
Treatment of know-how
The production and utilization of technological and organizational knowledge is a central economic activity that is handled in a most cavalier way within economic theory (an important exception is Hayek 1945) . In reality, know-how is often tacit, in that those practicing a technique can do so with great facility, but they may not be able to transfer the skill to others without demonstration and involvement. The challenges posed by technological change for economics has been recognized since the publication of Frank Knight's (1921) work, but it was not until the publication of works of Teece (1981) and Nelson and Winter (1982) that the tacit nature of technological and organizational knowledge became fully 6 The link between bounded rationality and satisficing was first made explicit in the work of Simon (1955) , although the idea of limited rationality dates back to at least the time of publication of Simon's (1947) work. Winter (2000) discusses a satisficing approach to strategic management.
Understanding complex organization 403 recognized. 7 In recent years, the emphasis on tacit knowledge has initiated entire new areas in business education (such as "knowledge management"), in addition to providing much needed light on central organizational problems such as routines.
Inadequacy of the theory of the firm
Although economics now has alternative theories of the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 1985 , the central questions (the boundaries of the firm-the appropriate degree of vertical, lateral, or horizontal integration) lie outside the domain of the traditional economic analysis. And still, most textbook theory is completely silent with respect to the internal structure of the firm; even many contemporary theories of the firm neglect central (non-incentive based) issues.
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As Simon (1991 Simon ( , 1993 has strongly argued, it is not all about incentives; issues of organizational identification can be a powerful force in explaining organizational matters. Organizational identification is a form of group loyalty, "a powerful altruistic force" that conditions "both participants' goals and the cognitive models they form of their situations" (Simon, 1993: 160) .
Suppression of entrepreneurship
In economics, change is so often modeled as a movement from one equilibrium condition to another, leaving no role for entrepreneurs or managers. 9 The development of a theory of entrepreneurship-or at least a theory which does not suppress the importance of entrepreneurship-is of critical importance to economic science as well as to management education. The role of entrepreneurs is significant in creating 7
Frank Knight is an often neglected advocate for the fact that technological change make economic predictions difficult; as he stated: "The most fundamentally and irretrievably uncertain phases or factors of progress are those which amount essentially to the increase of knowledge as such. This description evidently holds for the improvement of technological processes and the forms of business organization and for the discovery of new natural resources. Here it is a contradiction in terms to speak of anticipation, in an accurate and detailed sense, for to anticipate the advance would be to make it at once." (Knight, 1921, p. 318 ).
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Even Milgrom and Roberts agree, as they note, "The incentive based transaction costs theory has been made to carry too much of the weight of explanation in the theory of organizations. We expect competing and complementary theories to emerge-theories that are founded on economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more attention to changing technology and to evolutionary considerations" (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988: 450) .
9
As Baumol puts it, "Obviously, the entrepreneur has been read out of the model. There is no room for enterprise or initiative. The management group becomes a passive calculator that reacts mechanically to changes imposed on it by fortuitous external developments over which it does not exert, and does not even attempt to exert, any influence. One hears of no clever ruses, ingenious schemes, brilliant innovations, of no charisma or of any of the other stuff in which outstanding entrepreneurship is made; one does not hear of them because there is no way in which they can fit into the model" (Baumol, 1968: 67) .
both firms and markets. Ronald Coase argued that "the provision of markets is an entrepreneurial activity" (Coase, 1988: 8) . And Frank Knight (1921) perceptively linked the existence of firms to entrepreneurs seizing opportunities for profit in the face of uncertainty: "It is ... true uncertainty which ... gives the characteristic form of 'enterprise' to economic organization as a whole and accounts for the peculiar income of the entrepreneur" (1921: 232).
10

Stylized markets
In neoclassical markets, transactions are performed by faceless economic agents operating in impersonal product or factor markets. Although there is some consideration given to the role of reputation effects, the immense variety of institutional supports to market processes-such as trust, friendship, law, and reciprocity-are barely recognized. Intermediate markets and relational contracting are virtually absent from the textbooks and most advanced theorizing. By stripping out the institutional and organizational foundations of market structure, the conventional tools of economic analysis are rendered impotent before many strategic management problems. These were the five issues that Teece and Winter identified twenty yeas ago as barriers to productive dialogue between economic theory and management theory. Recent efforts by Teece and Winter and others in building a framework for, and theory of, dynamic capabilities can be seen as an attempt to solve these problems and create a broader (inter)disciplinary framework.
Meanwhile, considerable progress has been made in economics and in the social sciences in crafting more realistic foundations for the theory of the firm. The field of strategic management has built on those contributions. For instance, the ideas of Simon, Cyert, and March on "bounded rationality," opportunistic behavior, conflict, learning, and routines were significant inputs for both transaction cost economics and evolutionary economics. In the mid-1980s, strategy scholars began to realize the usefulness of these developments in understanding firm behavior. For example, Teece (1984) argued that the evolutionary ideas of Nelson and Winter would help in providing a theory of the firm's distinctive competencies. Routines can be thought of as the skills of the organization. The firm is an entity with a limited range of capabilities based on its available routines and physical assets. The emphasis on routines animates other concepts such as path dependency; a firm's capabilities are defined very much by where it has been in the past and what it has done. Its current performance is a function of engrained repertoires (Teece, 1984; Dosi, 1988; March, 1994) . Path dependencies and established technological trajectories shape the opportunities faced 10 His full argument is as follows: "With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of productive activities. ... its [business firms'] existence in the world is a direct result of the fact of uncertainty" (1921: 271).
Understanding complex organization
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by firms. Simon encapsulates many of these ideas in his 1993 Strategic Management Journal paper: "A business firm's 'niche' or comparative advantage typically has a half-life of years rather than decades. Strategic planning must assure a stream of new ideas that allow the firm to find new sources of comparative advantage. Strategic planning must focus attention on the initial stages of the decision-making processes-opportunities and occasions for choice, and the design of new action strategies for products, marketing, and financing. Product identification and alternative generation are crucial components of strategy. Strategic thinking must permeate the entire organization. Effective identification of employees with the organization's strategy requires their exposure to the basic postulates that underlie strategic plans."
One of the research traditions that builds on and extends Winter's work is dynamic capabilities. These can be defined as the particular (non-imitability) capacity firms have to shape, reshape, configure, and reconfigure enterprise assets so as to respond to changing technologies and markets. Dynamic capabilities, therefore, relate to the firm's ability to adapt in order to generate and exploit internal and external firmspecific competences and to address the firms changing environment (Teece et al., 1997) . The dynamic capability perspective follows Hayek (1945) (and the behavioral and evolutionary theorists) in emphasizing that coordination as an economic problem only occurs because of change. In a static environment, a short period of "set up" would be required to organize economic activity; but absent change in consumer tastes or technology, economic agents (both traders and managers) would sort out the optimal flows of goods and services (together with methods of production). Thereafter, there would be no need for their services. Now introduce change. If there were a complete set of forward and contingent claims markets, adjustments would occur automatically; absent a complete set of futures and contingent claims markets, there is the need for economic agents to engage in trading activities and for managers/entrepreneurs to "integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments" (Teece et al., 1997) . Coordinating and adapting effectively to changing environments (Cyert and March, 1963) is an element of a firm's dynamic capabilities.
The nature and distinct character of dynamic capabilities
Although dynamic capabilities build on insights from evolutionary and behavioral economics, it is not just an application of those frameworks. It accepts the possibility that the firm's portfolio of assets can and must be "orchestrated" by management. Economic change is not just about "adaptation." Although coordination and adaptation are important, they do not convey very well activities such as proactive investment in R&D, the search for new technologies, and the selection and the subsequent implementation of particular technologies and business models critical to enterprise success. Nor does the concept of adaptation convey the importance of asset alignment, opportunity identification, and securing access to critical cospecialized assets. These are all-important elements of an organization's dynamic capabilities and are important to value creation.
11 They are underplayed in some branches of evolutionary and behavioral economics.
To further clarify the role of dynamic capabilities, it makes sense to also distinguish between different types. Not all aspects of firm behavior and response manifest dynamic capabilities. As Sidney Winter (2003) notes "ad hoc problem solving" is not necessarily a capability.
Dynamic capabilities have multiple origins, some rooted in routinized behavior, some rooted in asset selection/investment choices, and some rooted in creative and differentiated entrepreneurial acts, which involve unusual skills that are not particularly imitable. Consider for example the creation of dynamic capabilities through routines. In the works of Teece and Pisano (1994) and Teece et al. (1997) , routines (or "processes") were an essential element of dynamic capabilities. The treatment was specific in separating out production routines to sustain current operations from learning routines designing to achieve improvement. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) recognize that some "dynamic capabilities actually consist of identifiable and specific routines that often have been the subject of extensive empirical research in their own right " (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1107) . Examples include product development routines, quality control routines, and technology transfer and knowledge transfer routines. Eisenhardt and Martin correctly note that the classification of such processes as dynamic capabilities also enables the empirical foundations of the dynamic capability literature to be immediately expanded. They also point out that many dynamic capabilities have common features and cannot therefore be used to undergird differential performance. They reference cross-function R&D teams that are now widely recognized as essential for superior product development. It is undoubtedly correct that some routines have common features; but as Eisenhardt and Martin themselves point out, even though there may be common features, there are also points of difference too. Indeed, they note that successful innovation requires knowledge of customer/user needs; firms that recognize this basic requirement have many different ways (routines) for figuring out customer's needs and preferences. Each approach has different performance outcomes.
Although much of the literature appears to define a firm's dynamic capabilities almost entirely in terms of its change routines or routines designing its renovate routines, there are other types of dynamic capabilities which are important too. For example, the creation of dynamic capabilities through entrepreneurial leadership. In 11 Part of the dynamics of dynamic capabilities is captured in Figure 1 in the end of this article. A detailed discussion on the precise nature of dynamic capabilities is provided in the article of Teece (2006). addition to the routinized foundations of dynamic capabilities stemming from R&D, quality circles, knowledge transfer, and the like, there is perhaps a far more important source of dynamic capabilities-the ability not just to sense changing market and technological opportunities, but to seize them through effectuating "new combinations." This is where entrepreneurial aspects of management come into play and where the distinctive (transactional) competence of the firm meets knowledge/skill competences. The behavior in question is not necessarily a routinized activity in the sense of Winter (2003) ; Dynamic capabilities of this kind require judgment, passion, conviction, superior insight, and leadership (see March, 1996; Augier and Teece, 2005) . It is not ad hoc problem solving. The activity is inherently entrepreneurial. It involves much more than minimizing transaction costs and/or avoiding contractual hazards. It involves value creation as well as value protection.
An idea first advanced by Penrose is that firms have resources which can be deployed into multiple product arenas. However, Penrose did not explain just how this happened or what skills undergird this activity. At minimum, it would appear to require deep knowledge of the firm's internal capabilities. This might appear to be readily accomplished by management. However, in enterprises of significant size, it is a non-trivial challenge. Although firms may have a codified inventory of tangible assets, intangible assets are less readily categorized. Indeed, management is sometimes quite ignorant of the firm's knowledge assets.
The astute performance of "integration" functions is difficult when firms erect internal boundaries or "silos." For instance, the automobile companies in the US in the 1980s began to once again experiment with and relearn how to form cross-divisional and cross-functional teams. This required the tearing down or at least bridging "silos." These capabilities might sound modest; however, achieving effective internal cooperation is not a trivial accomplishment. It requires good incentive alignment and shared goals throughout the organization. It is not just a matter of finding and implementing good integration routines (as discussed above), although this is undoubtedly part of it. Particularly in (large traditional) hierarchies, achieving functional "integration" is a major organizational accomplishment. It requires persistent and astute management and entrepreneurship to succeed.
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Each source of dynamic capabilities can be an independent basis of sustainable competitive advantage. Each is in that sense "strategic." There are other sources of dynamic capabilities, too-some of them are captured in Figure 1 . 
Themes of special importance to dynamic capabilities: cospecialization and decomposability
Of the ideas that have surfaced over the decades in strategic management, there are some that seem particularly relevant to the current nature and dynamics of strategic thinking, although they have not yet been prominently placed in the literature. In particular, there is in the dynamic capabilities framework a special role for ideas on complementary and cospecialized assets and for ideas on decentralization and decomposability. These are issues that are intimately linked to the emerging microfoundations of dynamic capabilities, so we briefly introduce them here. The idea of cospecialization and specialized assets can be found in the pre-capabilities literature, most notably in Teece (1986) . Prior to that, it was common to stress that various innovations are substitutes, rather than complements that may be cospecialized to each other. Indeed, Schumpeter stressed that successful innovations/firms are threatened by swarms of imitators, all striving to product "me-too" substitutes.
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Of equal significance, particularly in industries in which innovation might be characterized as cumulative is complementary innovation. For instance, in the enterprise software industry, developers may create business applications which are especially valuable to users if they can somehow be integrated into a single program or into a tightly integrated suite. In video cameras and binoculars, the development of gyroscopic stabilizers make imaging devices easy to use and enhance the product, especially if the new feature can be introduced at low cost. Likewise, better batteries enable personal computers and cell phones to run longer between charging. Situations of complementarity between technologies, and between technologies and other parts of the value chain, are extraordinarily common, yet infrequently featured in economic analysis and in strategy formulation. A key choice (strategic) managers make is whether to develop new products and services by using value-enhancing combinations of cospecialized assets (Teece, 1986) .
Cospecialized assets are complementary assets where the value of an asset is a function of its use in conjunction with other assets. With positive cospecialization, joint use is value enhancing.
15 Situations of cospecialization can emerge from R&D investments or from "thin" markets, i.e. the assets in question are idiosyncratic and not readily bought and sold in a market. Capturing cospecialization benefits frequently requires integrated operations. Cospecialization allows differentiated product offerings or unique cost savings. The inherent thin market environment means that competitors are not able to rapidly assemble the same assets and hence cannot offer the same products/services at competing price points. An organization's ability to identify, develop, and utilize specialized and cospecialized assets built or bought is at the heart of the dynamic capabilities approach. A specialized asset is one where the asset cannot be put to alternative use without loss in value. In the classic mine-mouth coal-fired electric power facility (Joskow, 1985) , once the electricity-generating facility is built at the mine mouth, there is a contractual hazard associated with obtaining coal from the mine. Long-term contracts entered into may or may not suffice to provide adequate protection against the mine owners jacking up the price of coal to the dependent generating facility. If the mine owners can sell coal in (thick) global markets, they might conceivably not be dependent on the generating facility. If the power facility cannot get the same or similar coal from another mine at the same price, and if the coal mine cannot dispose of its coal elsewhere except at a lower price, then the condition of cospecialization exists.
With cospecialization, special value can be created (and potentially appropriated) when owners of assets are not cognizant of the value of an asset to another party with idiosyncratic assets whose value will be enhanced through combination. This arises because the markets for cospecialized assets are necessarily thin. Because the cospecialized assets in question are unique, competitors cannot necessarily obtain these assets, and even if they could, the cospecialized asset is likely to have a different value in use if the competitor has a different portfolio of complementary assets.
The computer, software, and electronics industries are riddled with cospecialization requirements and opportunities. The ability of management to effectuate the coordination of cospecialized assets (through own development, design, or astute purchase) is an essential (dynamic) capability necessary to seize new opportunities and manage threats. Trading skills (which is what market agents normally possess) will not suffice to build competitive advantage. Decisions on whether to build or buy and when to deploy cospecialized assets will depend upon many factors besides transaction costs. Some were made explicit in the article of Teece (1986) . For instance, in the context of innovation, whether management ought build or buy complementary and/or cospecialized assets depends on several factors including (1) relative positioning of other asset owners, (2) cash availability, and (3) timing, i.e. can the asset be built in time. These considerations are broader than those highlighted by transaction cost economics, and they suggest the importance of asset ownership/control and certain types of merger and acquisition activities. There is an important future area here in the role of cospecialization as part of the microfoundations for capability theory.
Another theme of importance to strategic thinking is around decentralization and decomposability.
Decentralization and decomposition
Recent events (in both international affairs and business) require understanding different organizational structures and quasi structures, systems that are highly variegated, Understanding complex organization 411 and have significant elements of decomposability.
16 This is another example of a theme significant to the future of capabilities research. When Herbert Simon first introduced the idea of near decomposability, it was intended to contribute to our understanding of a central and fundamental property of multi-celled organisms-but it is potentially also central to our understanding of some of the mechanisms of some enemy structures (terrorist networks, cells, etc.), too. Such organizations consist of a hierarchy of components, such that at any level of the hierarchy, the rates of interaction within components at the level are much higher than the rates of interaction between different components.
17
Human organizations-business and military organizations alike-often come into being because of the need for some activities to be coordinated more closely than can readily be done through market exchange. Of course, coordination comes with some costs, among them costs of communication and providing motivation for members of the organization to work toward a common goal. To minimize the costs and problems of coordination, organizers try to divide up their activities in a way that there is as much independence as feasible for each of the component divisions and departments. As long as the appropriate motivation/incentives can be provided for those who staff the components, the effort of coordination will decline with the degree of mutual independence.
Thus, a central principal of organizational design is to divide the work among components in such a way as to minimize needs for coordination. One can design neardecomposable organizations and expect them to work well, e.g. semi-independent 16 Events such as 9/11 and the general emergence of a more decomposed organizational structure of the enemies as well as (in business strategy) issues of "new organizational form" are examples. 17 To characterize, consider the following metaphor: Imagine a large building, with very many rooms with thick walls, each room divided into smaller cubicles with thinner walls. Then, some external disruption occurs, causing the temperature in each cubic centimeter of air to be different from each adjoining cubic centimeter, each cubicle exhibiting a sizable temperature difference from each adjoining cubicle, each room from each adjoining room, and the whole set of rooms from the outdoors. We hold the outdoor temperature constant and shut off the heating and air conditioning, close all doors, and see what happens. Rapidly, the temperatures of all the air particles in any single cubicle will become essentially equal. But the end of an hour, the temperature of all the cubicles in a given room will be the same. By the end of eight hours, the temperatures of all the rooms will be about the same. And by the end of the day, all the rooms will be at the same temperature as the outside air. Never mind that the exact times of equilibration of the place would depend of the Newton coefficient of heat transmission through the walls and ceilings; the sequence is clear. A nearly decomposable system can be thought of as a boxes-within-boxes hierarchy with an arbitrary number of levels. Its special characteristic is that equilibrating interactions within boxes at any level take place much more rapidly than do interactions between boxes at that same level, and similarly all the way to the top of the hierarchy-all this without explicit direction or leadership from any positions of "power" or authority.
dealers who have a supply contract with the manufacturers. 18 The modern economy has many hybrid structures between market-connected agents and near-decomposable organizations. Sole suppliers of parts are an example of hybridization, and large divisionalized conglomerates constitute yet another. The ability to design neardecomposable organizational systems into the organization is another element of a firm's dynamic capabilities.
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Concluding remarks
Many contributors to strategic management and organization regard the discovery that "dynamics matter" as an occasion to celebrate the centrality of evolutionary economics. This is appropriate. But a richer framework is necessary. Evolutionary (and behavioral) analysis needs to be married to entrepreneurial frameworks which recognize that managers have choices and need to make quality decisions and orchestrate cospecialized assets. Organizations make it possible to make decisions by virtue of the fact that they constrain the set of alternatives to be considered and the considerations that are to be treated as relevant. Decision-making can be improved by changing the ways in which issues are framed. Decision error proclivities need to be identified and guarded against. Many useful insights were present in Winter's early work and have been elaborated in the decades after. In particular, the framework of dynamic capabilities further elaborates the role of knowledge and intangibles in value creation. Although business strategist may have been slow to build resources and capabilities into their analytical frameworks, military strategies have not. Elements of military strategy noted by Clauswitz include intellectual and psychological qualities: the size, composition, and armament of forces, as well as operations. 20 An early statement of how resources and capabilities come into place in warfare can be found than in Sun Tsu:
18 More recent scholarships have suggested that even further decentralization and decomposition in large organizations may be beneficial (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993) . Indeed, there is now considerable related evidence suggesting that an enterprises' performance is impacted by its abilities to continuously build, combine, integrate, and reconfigure resources and competences. By way of example, Henderson and Cockburn (1994) found that an enterprise's ability to integrate knowledge from external sources-their "architectural competence"-was positively associated with research productivity, as measured by patent counts. Likewise, Iansiti and Clark (1994) found that "integration capability" in the automobile industry and in the computer industry was associated with positive enterprise performance, demonstrating to the authors the importance of knowledge integration skills.
When ten to an enemies one, surround him. If double has strength, divide him. If equally matched you may engage him. If weaker, be capable of withdrawing. And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him. 21 Likewise, in an echo of the dynamic capabilities framework, Sun Tsu notes, "fixation is the way to death, fluidity is the way of life" (op cit).
Although military strategists in the post-war years emphasized resources more than capabilities (e.g. the preoccupation during the Cold war on balance of power issues), in the new era of counter terrorism, the utility of dynamic capabilities ought be brought into sharper focus. As a general matter, dynamic capabilities become of greater salience when uncertainty increases and change is more rapid. It is for this reason that the framework is especially relevant to high-tech industries where both markets and competition are evolving rapidly. Also, if an enterprise is indeed "Penrosian" (i.e. it has flexibility to produce and sell a variety of products with its known resources), then it has some level of product market flexibility, even if its underlying "resources" cannot change much over time. This does not mean that an enterprise can "stretch" its product line whenever it wants and wherever it wants. It may be "stuck" at the resource level, but it will still have some level of product line flexibility. Also, through dynamic capabilities, an enterprise can add to its resources/asset base and change its resource configuration.
Sidney Winter thought about the development of capabilities as an evolutionary process. His work is a continuing source of inspiration for those who want to further develop these important matters-in business strategy, in organization theory, and also in economic theory. We are amongst a large number of colleagues who have learned from his insights.
